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Abstract 
Cold War Europe’s largest and most intensive act of ethnic cleansing, namely, the 1989 expulsion of 
Turks from communist Bulgaria, remains a neglected subject three decades on after the event. When it 
took place, the term “ethnic cleansing” had not been invented yet, so in light of international law this 
expulsion was a “population transfer.” Population transfers (even unilateral) were deemed legal until 
the mid-1990s. Subsequently, under the influence of the atrocities committed during the wars of 
Yugoslav succession, population transfers were criminalized and relabeled as “ethnic cleansings.” For a 
variety of reasons, the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing has been also neglected by scholars and politicians in 
both, Bulgaria and Turkey. The neglect continues to this day, despite the Bulgarian Parliament’s 
momentous 2012 Declaration, which officially recognized the expulsion as an act of ethnic cleansing. 
This Declaration – which could become a basis for successful Turkish-Bulgarian reconciliation – 
largely remains unknown in both countries, while the propagandistic terminology employed for 
referring to the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing deepens the oblivion and obfuscates the nature of this tragic 
event. Both, in Turkish and Bulgarian, official and scholarly terminology employed suggests – 
incorrectly – that it was a “kind of emigration.” 
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Introduction 
The reflection gives a brief overview of the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing of communist Bulgaria’s Turks. 
This tragic event is curiously left unmentioned and unanalyzed in literature, be it internationally or in 
Bulgaria and Turkey. Yet, without remembering about this ethnic cleansing, it is next to impossible to 
explain the fall of communism and the subsequent emergence of democracy in Bulgaria. Whatever 
scant reflection on the tragedy is hidden within the broader Bulgarian discourse on the 1984-1989 
Forced Assimilation Campaign. This brings to the for the methodological question why thus far 
scholars have preferred not to treat and probe into the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing as an event in its own 
right. Especially so, because such an evading approach has been responsible for concealing or belittling 
this tragedy be it in Bulgaria or at the international level. Likewise, the use of communist propaganda’s 
euphemism “Big Excursion” for this ethnic cleansing mendaciously denies the tragic character of the 
event. Hence, using an explicit name for the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing and researching this event in its 
own right seem to be the right way forward, as also pointed out by the Bulgarian Parliament’s 
momentous 2012 Declaration. This groundbreaking Declaration unequivocally recognizes this tragedy 
as an act of ethnic cleansing. Unfortunately, neither international scholars, nor their counterparts in 





The Thirtieth Anniversary of the Forgotten 1989 Ethnic Cleansing 
Three decades ago, in the summer of 1989, about 360,000 Turks (including some Slavophone Muslims, 
or Pomaks) were expelled from communist Bulgaria to capitalist Turkey.1 It was the largest and most 
intensive act of ethnic cleansing in Cold War Europe after the late 1940s, which saw the wrapping up 
of the Potsdam-agreed expulsions (“population transfers”2) of ‘ethnic Germans’ from central and 
eastern Europe to the Allies’ occupation zones of the Third Reich (that later morphed into Austria, East 
Germany and West Germany). This 1989 Ethnic Cleansing pushed hundreds of thousands across the 
presumably impenetrable Iron Curtain, from the Warsaw Pact member state to the NATO member.3  
This fact points to some secret negotiations between Moscow and Washington, which prevented 
treating such a unilateral breach of the NATO-Warsaw Pact military frontier as a casus belli. 
Researchers know nothing about these negotiations as the relevant documents still classified and sealed 
off in military archives in Russia and the United States.4 Because no global war broke out as a result of 
the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing, the study of this expulsion has been neglected. It fell under the proverbial 
 
1  Tomasz Kamusella, Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War: The Forgotten 1989 Expulsion of Turks from Communist 
Bulgaria (London: Routledge 2018), 56-57.  
2 Under international law population transfer was a legal instrument of statecraft (that is, state building and maintenance) in 
the twentieth century: Jennifer Jackson Preece, “Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State Creation: Changing 
State Practices and Evolving Legal Norms,” Human Rights Quarterly 20 no. 4 (1998): 819. However, its use was 
increasingly limited and gradually criminalized in the second half of the twentieth century, and especially after the fall of 
communism: Vincent Chetail, “Is There Any Blood on My Hands? Deportation as a Crime of International Law,” Leiden 
Journal of International Law 29, no. 3 (2016): 917-943; Preece, “Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State 
Creation,” 832, 935, 840. Beginning with the mid-1990s population transfer was relabeled as “ethnic cleansing,” and is 
considered a crime against humanity: Robin Geiß, “Ethnic Cleansing; 3. International Criminal Law; (b) Ethnic Cleansing 
as a Crime against Humanity,” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Platform: Oxford Public 
International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e789 (Accessed 30 April 2019); 
Preece, “Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State Creation,” 819. 
3 Sofia’s unilateral move amounted to a casus belli, which should have resulted in a third world war. The army of the 
People’s Republic of Bulgaria would have stood no chance against the largest standing NATO army in Europe (See: Senem 
Aydın-Düzgit and Nathalie Tocci, Turkey and the European Union (London: Palgrave, 2015), 117). Hence, the Soviet 
Union’s Red Army would have needed to intervene in order to protect Bulgaria. In turn, this move would have necessitated 
involvement from the United States, thus ensuring that the conflict would have spiraled into a worldwide conflagration. But 
no third world war occurred in 1989. 
4 Obviously, this proposition about the possibility of a third world war, and the prevention of its outbreak by some, as yet 
unknown, United States-Soviet secret negotiations, is just a working hypothesis. It still needs to be researched, and does not 
preclude another explanation of the largely pacific character of the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing, without any military 




radar of world public opinion, including scholars. Although the western press covered this 1989 Ethnic 
Cleansing extensively, all the reports were buried in the midst of the Guardian, the Times, the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, or Le Monde. The story made it to the front pages only in Turkish and 
Yugoslav newspapers. 
 Numerous contemporary events deemed as “more momentous” by the western press pushed the 
1989 expulsion of Bulgaria’s Turks (and Slavophone Muslims, or Pomaks) out of the view of Europe’s 
public opinion. Such events included, for instance, the Round Table negotiations between the 
communist government and the anti-communist democratic opposition in Poland, followed, on 4 June 
1989, by the first-ever (partially) free democratic elections in this country. This initial breach in the 
Soviet-style communist system shortly led to the fall of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet 
bloc. On the same day, the totalitarian regime of communist China bloodily suppressed the student pro-
democracy demonstrations in the Tiananmen Square Massacre. A day earlier, on 3 June 1989, the 
Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, had passed away. These were the newsworthy stories which 
overshadowed the beginning of the expulsion of Turks (and Slavophone Muslims, or Pomaks) from 
communist Bulgaria. On 29 May 1989, the communist dictator of three decades and a half, Todor 
Zhivkov, delivered a televized speech that obliquely announced this ethnic cleansing.5 It was a reaction 
to the mass protests and hunger strikes staged by 60,000 Turks and Muslims in the last two weeks of 
May 1989.6 
These aforementioned May Protests of 1989 falsify the rife myth, repeated in numerous 
publications, that Bulgaria was the sole member of the Soviet bloc where no anti-communist mass 
demonstrations were ever observed. Furthermore, it is important to note that the sole mass dissident 
 
5 Todor Zhivkov, “Edinstvo na bulgarskiia narod e grizha i sudba na vseki grazhdanin na nasheto milo otechestvo” [The 
Unity of the Bulgarian Nation is the Responsibility and Fate of Each Citizen of Our Dear Fatherland], Rabotnichesko delo, 
30 May 1989, 1. 
6 Veselin Angelov, ed., Protestite na turtsite v Bulgariia sreshtu vuzroditelniia protses, 20–30 mai 1989 g. Dokumenti [The 





movement in communist Bulgaria was almost exclusively Turkish and Muslim from the ethnic 
(ethnoconfessional) perspective. Unfortunately, in today’s democratic Bulgaria, this ethnic character of 
the movement prevents remembering about its pivotal role in causing the fall of the communist system 
in this country. 
 Elena Marushiakova and Veselin Popov propose that it may be inappropriate to label the May 
Protests of 1989 as “anti-communist,” because the protesters wanted an end to anti-Turkish and anti-
Muslim measures, not to overthrow the communist (socialist) system in Bulgaria. However, neither the 
Prague Spring of 1968, nor the Solidarity movement of 1980-1981 aimed at overthrowing the 
communist system, either. The protesters in Czechoslovakia and Poland desired a reform of the 
communist system, which would better take into account individual human needs (hence, the 
Czechoslovak slogan of “socialism with a human face”). However, the aforementioned events in 
Czechoslovakia and Poland are now commonly interpreted as ‘anti-communist.’ It is so on the account 
of the fact that their participants attempted to breach the main pillar of this system, namely, the 
communist party’s monopoly of politics and power. Hence, from this perspective and with today’s 
advantage of comparative hindsight, I believe, the May Protests of 1989 in Bulgaria can and should be 
qualified as “anti-communist.” 
 The ethnic cleansing announced by Zhivkov’s speech lasted unabated until 22 August 1989, 
when Turkey closed the border with Bulgaria to expellees, namely, to “Bulgarian citizens without a 
Turkish visa.”7 More Bulgarian Turks and Slavophone Muslims (Pomaks) followed shortly, supplied 
with now required Turkish visas in their passports, but even more began returning from Turkey (about 
3,000 in July-August 1989, around 70,000 by late 1989, 130,000 by August 1990, and as many as 
around 200,000 by late 19918). It was the first-ever case of a mass return of expellees recorded in 
 
7 Kemal Kirişci “‘Coerced Immigrants:’ Refugees of Turkish Origins since 1945,” International Migration 34, no. 3 (1996): 
385-412. 




modern European history.9 However, the administrative pro-expulsion pressure continued in 
communist Bulgaria until 29 December 1989, when the Communist Party of Bulgaria promised to 
return all human, civil and minority rights to the country’s Turks and Slavophone Muslims (or 
Pomaks).10 It took two long years to fulfill this promise in the face of mass protests staged by Bulgarian 
nationalist communists-turned-nationalists against this decision.11 In this way a “Yugoslav-style” 
ethnic civil war or a breakup of the country was prevented a couple of years before the actual 
commencement of the wars of Yugoslav succession. 
 During the second half of 1989, other developments were deemed more worth featuring on the 
front pages of the western press than the ethnic cleansing in Bulgaria and its domestic and international 
ramifications. During the summer, tens of thousands of East German tourists, instead of returning home 
from the Black Sea beaches of Romania and Bulgaria, streamed to the grounds of the West German 
embassies in Budapest and Prague, from where they eventually were allowed to leave for West 
Germany. In October 1989, the Round Table talks in Hungary concluded in a compromise, thus 
opening the way for the democratization of this country. On 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, 
and was shortly followed by the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. In December 1989, the bloody 
revolution toppled the communist dictator in Romania. These iconic events pushed out of world public 
opinion’s view the tragedy of the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing in Bulgaria, alongside the tribulations of the 
expellees in Turkey or of the returnees in still communist Bulgaria. Even the fall of communism in 
1990 in autocratic Albania (including ships with Albanian refugees in Italy) gained more attention from 
the global mass media than the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing. However, it was this 1989 Ethnic Cleansing that 
 
9 Veselin Angelov, ed., Obratnata vulna. Vrushtane grazhdanskite prava na bulgarskite turtsii (septembri 1989-ianuari 
1990) [The Returning Wave: Reinstating Civil Rights to Bulgarian Turks (September 1989 – January 1990)] (Sofia: At 
author’s expense 2012). 
10 Aleksandar Lilov, 1989 “Za preodoliavane na dopusnatite izvrashteniia sred tiurkoezichnoto i miusiulmansko naselenie v 
stranata” [To Overcome the Atrocities Committed Against the Turkic-speaking and Muslim Population in the Country], 
Rabotnichesko delo, 30 December 1989, 3 https://bulgaria1989.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/364_3.jpg (Accessed 1 August 
2015). 
11 Maria Bakalova, “The Bulgarian Turkish Names Conflict and Democratic Transition,” Innovation: The European Journal 




triggered the collapse of communism in Bulgaria and decisively conditioned the postcommunist 
transition in this country.12 
 Following the end of communism in Bulgaria in 1990/1991, many returnees and Bulgarian 
citizens of all ethnic origins began leaving for Turkey in search of gainful employment due to the 
collapse of the economy during the period of systemic transition. Unemployment was rife and salaries 
were insufficient to cover basic living costs.13 This free movement of people from Bulgaria to Turkey 
for work overlapped with the continuing return of expellees. As a result, in many observers’ eyes, the 
difference between ethnic cleansing and work migration became blurred, and seemed to vindicate the 
zhivkovite communist propaganda, which until early 1990, mendaciously proposed that the 1989 
Ethnic Cleansing was a case of “mass tourism.”14 The international mass media paid no attention to the 
aftermath of the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing, including this crucial distinction between work migration and 
expulsion, because the political and economic upheavals of the systemic transition from planned to 
market-oriented economy and from totalitarianism to democracy had already grabbed headlines. On top 
of that, the absorption of East Germany by West Germany (‘German reunification’), the shocking 
breakups of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, alongside the ethnic wars of Yugoslav succession 
and the First Iraq War (Gulf War) effectively overshadowed any developments in Bulgaria. 
  
The Methodological Question of Dis/Continuity 
Subsequently, no scholarly articles in any language, let alone a monograph, has been devoted to the 
1989 Ethnic Cleansing of communist Bulgaria’s Turks (and Slavophone Muslims, or Pomaks), until 
2018, when the first-ever study on this subject was published.15 Meanwhile, literally tens of thousands 
 
12 Kamusella, Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War, 3. 
13 Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Parla, “Broken Lines of Il/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty: The Impact of 
Visa Policies on Immigrants to Turkey from Bulgaria,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 34, no. 2 (2009): 207. 
14 Cf. Van’o Stoilov, “Za vas tuk miasto ne ma” [There Is No Place for You {Expellees} Here {in Turkey}], Rabotnichesko 
delo, 18 June 1989, 1-2. 




articles and thousands of books have been devoted to the post-Yugoslav wars on account of numerous 
cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide committed in their course. However, Bulgarian scholars tend to 
propose that the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing in Bulgaria was already covered in detail16 by Bulgarian 
researchers,17 including Roumen Avramov’s most extensive and authoritative study.18 
 Indeed, in all these books the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing is touched upon to a greater or lesser 
extent, but only as the endpoint of the 1984-1989 Forced Assimilation Campaign (usually referred in 
Bulgarian-language literature with the zhivkovite propaganda term Възродителен процес Vuzroditelen 
protses ‘Revival Process’). Ergo, the aforementioned book by Kamusella19 still stands as the first and 
(for the time being) sole study devoted exclusively to the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing. Yet, Bulgarian 
scholars20 propose that from the methodological standpoint of historiography, it is incorrect to research 
and analyze the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing as an event in its own right. They see it is an inalienable part of 
the aforementioned Forced Assimilation Campaign, which lasted for half a decade in the latter 1980s. 
Some even want a further flattening of the story by retelling it exclusively in the longue durée context 
of the series of expulsions (or ‘emigrations’ agreed with Turkey) from Bulgaria to Turkey during the 
entire communist period. 
 
16 Round Table on the “Revival Process” in Bulgaria (1984-1989): Looking Back (Sofia: Center for Advanced Studies 
2019). 
17 For instance, Ali Mekhmedov Aliev, Natsionalizmut i "vuzroditeniiat protses" [Nationalism and the “Revival Process”] 
(Razgrad: Poligraf 2001); Iskra Baeva and Evgeniia Kalinova, eds., “Vuzroditelniiat protses” [“The Revival Process”] (Vol 
2: Mezhdunarodni izmereniia (1984-1989)) [“The Revival Process’”(Vol. 2: International Relations (1984-1989))] (Ser: 
Arkhivite govoriat, Vol. 61) (Sofia: Durzhavna agentsiia Arkhivi 2009); Mikhail Gruev and Aleksei Kalionski, 
Vuzroditelniat protses. Musulmanskite obshtnosti i komunisticheskiat rezhim [The Revival Process: The Muslim 
Communities and the Communist Regime] (Sofia: Ciela 2012); Vasil Vasilev, Nationalismus unterm Roten Stern: 
Vorgeschichte, Durchführung und Auswirkungen der Namensänderungskampagne 1984-89 gegenüber der türkischen 
Minderheit in Bulgarien [Nationalism under the Red Star: Origins, Implementation and the Aftermath of the 1984-89 Name 
Changing Campaign, Which Targeted the Turkish Minority in Bulgaria] (Ser: Studien zur Geschichte, Kultur und 
Gesellschaft Südosteuropas, Vol 8) (Zürich and Münster: Lit 2011); Orlin Zagorov, Vuzroditelniiat protses. Teza, Aniteza, 
Otritsanie na otritsanieto [The Revival Process: Thesis, Antithesis, Negation of the Negation] (Sofia: Ares pres 1993). 
18 Rumen Avramov, Ikonomika na ,Vuzroditelniya protses’ [The Economics of the ‘Revival Process’] (Ser: Izsledovatelski 
forum). (Sofia: Tsentur za akademichni izsledvaniia / Centre for Advanced Study and Izdatelstvo Riva 2016). 
19 Kamusella, Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War. 




 In a nutshell, this methodological disagreement centers on what constitutes a historical fact and 
when it is appropriate to apply cesuras to the continuum of the human past for the sake of extracting 
such a fact for the purpose of description and analysis. To a degree, the procedure is always subjective 
as it is dependent on human choices. I propose, however, that the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing on many 
counts is a sufficiently distinctive and temporally self-contained event that can be easily and usefully 
studied in its own right. First of all, this ethnic cleansing has the undisputed clear-cut commencement 
date of 29 May 1989 and the equally well-defined (though more often debated) end date of 22 August 
1989. Second, unlike in the case of the forced emigrations of Bulgarian Turks (1950-1951 and 1969-
1978) negotiated with Turkey, the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing was Bulgaria’s unilateral imposition on 
Turkey. Third, the intensity of expulsion per unit of time during the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing was much 
higher in numerical terms than whatever was observed during the earlier forced emigrations from 
communist Bulgaria. The highest number of forced emigrants (expellees) per week amounted to 5,351 
persons in December 1950 and 1,284 persons in 1978, while to the staggering 31,182 persons in July 
1989.21 Fourth, the total number of expellees in 1989 was two and a half to three times higher than the 
total numbers of forced emigrants either in 1950-1951 (154,000), or in 1969-1978 (115,000).22 Last but 
not least, in the context of entire Cold War Europe in the period between 1949 and 1989, the 1989 
expulsion was the largest and most intensive ever during this time. 
 Hence, the Bulgarian insistence on treating the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing only as the endpoint of 
the 1984-1989 Forced Assimilation Campaign, or of the communist period’s forced emigrations, 
appears to be dubious on any methodological ground. I propose that the main motivation behind this 
insistence may be political in its character, namely, the intentional perpetuation of the observed neglect 
of any research, let alone the remembrance and commemoration, of this ethnic cleansing. The current 
national master narrative as taught in Bulgarian schools is steeped in the paramount myth of half a 
 
21 Rumen Avramov, Ikonomika na ,Vuzroditelniya protses,’ 713-714. 




millennium of “Turkish yoke (slavery, occupation; турско робство tursko robstvo),” when, 
presumably, the Ottomans23 all the time repressed Orthodox Christianity, forced Bulgarians (that is, 
Slavophone Orthodox Christians) to convert to Islam, and killed anti-Ottoman rebels and their rural 
sympathizers.24  
In Bulgarian school textbooks the period of Ottoman rule is teleologicaly presented as the time 
of never-ending national uprisings of the Bulgarians against the Islamic empire, “inescapably, leading 
to the founding of the ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious in its character Bulgarian nation-state, with 
Russia’s ‘fraternal help.’”25 Yet, such rebellions could not be “national,” since the concept of the nation 
was invented only in eighteenth-century western Europe, and implemented in the Bulgarian lands 
during the late nineteenth century. Second, such rebellions were short-lived and localized, typically 
triggered by irregularities in administration, perceived as injustice on the part of the concerned. Third, 
participation in these rebellions was not limited to Christians, wronged Muslim peasants often joined, 
too. Fourth, what is lauded as хайдушки дружини khaidushki druzhini “groups of hajduks” (from 
Hungarian hajdúk “brigands, mercenaries,” singular hajdú, stems from hajtó “cattle drover,” in turn 
from the Hungarian verb hajt “to drive [cattle];” yielded the Turkish word haydut “bandit, brigand, 
thug, outlaw”) were none other than robbers and highwaymen, who stemmed from outlaws of a variety 
 
23 In the European stereotypical perception, the Ottomans were labelled as ‘Turks,’ though in reality the Ottomans were 
ethnolinguistically highly variegated, in the meaning of the population of the Ottoman Empire, the members of the millet of 
Islam, or this empire’s elite (cf Božidar Jezernik, ed., Imagining 'the Turk,' (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing 2010)). A similar stereotypical ethnonym of ‘Frank’ developed in the Ottoman Empire and across Muslim south 
Asia for referring to (Christian) Europeans, irrespective of their ethnolinguistic and confessional differentiation (cf. Farang 
in Wikipedia (2019) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farang. (Accessed 30 April 2019); Frankokrasi [Frankokratia] Vikipedi 
(2019) https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankokrasi (Accessed 30 April 2019)). 
24 Cf. Bernard Lory, “Razsazhdenia varkhu istoricheskia mit ‘Pet veka ni klakha’” [Reflections on the Historical Myth 'Five 
Centuries We Were Slaughtered'] [translated from the French by Georgi Peev]. Istorichesko badeshte no. 1 (1997); Rumen 
Petrov, Oburkani v bolkata. Sotsialna travma i sotsialna otgovornost [Confused in Pain: Social Trauma and Social 
Responsibility] (Sofia: Paradoks 2018): 115-125. 
25 Cf. Aleksandur Fol, ed., Bulgarite. Atlas / The Bulgarians: Atlas (Vol 3: Bulgariia pod osmansko vladichestvo. Bulgarsko 
vuzrazhdane / Bulgaria Under Ottoman Rule: Bulgarian Revival, edited by Khristo Matanov) [special edition of the 
company Standart Niuz / Standart News; approved for school use by the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science] 
(Sofia: TANGARA and TanNakRa 2008); L. Tsvetkov, ed., 1995. Atlas po istoriia za 5 klas [History Atlas for the 5th 




of ethnoreligious backgrounds.26 Fifth, in order to make unwilling peasants join an uprising, ringleaders 
often resorted to burning the former’s houses and to killing local Muslim officials. Because of the latter 
peasants joined, since they feared Ottoman reprisals conducted in line with the logic of collective 
responsibility.27 Sixth, the Russian involvement in the Balkans during the nineteenth century 
introduced anti-Semitism and pogroms of Jews into a permanent element of the then coalescing 
Bulgarian and other Slavic national movements.28 
Had the Ottomans really applied the type of assimilationist repressions (alluded in Bulgarian 
history textbooks) unceasingly for half a millennium in the Balkans, no Orthodox Christians (or even 
Slavophones) would have remained in the Bulgarian lands. For instance, during the Caucasian War 
(1817-1864), it took the Russian Empire only half a century to expel and eradicate the Muslim 
Circassians from Circassia (today’s Krasnodar Region).29 The Bulgarian myth of “Turkish yoke” stems 
from the Russian slavist and ethnographer (of Rusyn origin), Iurii (Yuriy) Venelin’s, three-volume 
study Drevniie i nyneshnioe bolgare v politicheskom, narodopisnom, istoricheskom i religioznom ikh 
otnoshenii k rossiianam (Bulgarians in Their Political, Ethnographic, Historical and Religious 
Relations to the Russians, 1829-1841). An abridged edition, titled, Kriticheskiie issledovaniia ob istorii 
bolgar (Contributions to the History of the Bulgarians) came off the press in 1849, and subsequently 
was published in a Bulgarian translation (Kritichesky izdyrianiia za Istoriia-ta blugarska [sic]) in 1853 
in Semlin, Austrian Empire (today’s Zemun in Serbia).30 This negative stereotype was internalized and 
 
26 Fikret Adanir, “Heiduckentum und osmanische Herrschaft. Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte der Diskussion um das 
frühneuzeitliche Räuberwesen in Südosteuropa” [Hajduks and Ottoman rule: Socio-Historical Aspects of the Phenomenon 
of Brigandage in Early Modern Southeastern Europe] Südost-Forschungen 41 (1982): 43-116. 
27  Brendan William Larkin [Honors dissertation], The Times and the Bulgarian Massacres. Middletown: Wesleyan 
University 2009), 62-63 http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.895.7166&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
(Accessed: 4 May 2019). 
28 Bartłomiej Rusin, “Ekscesy antyżydowskie na ziemiach bułgarskich Imperium Osmańskiego w czasie wojny rosyjsko-
tureckiej 1877–1878” [Anti-Jewish Excesses in the Bulgarian Lands of the Ottoman Empire During the Russo-Turkish War 
of 1877-1878] Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 51, no. 1 (2016): 5-21. 
29 Cf. Walter Richmond, The Circassian Genocide (Ser: Genocide, Political Violence, Human Rights) (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press 2013); Manfred Quiring, Der vergessene Völkermord. Sotschi und die Tragödie der Tscherkessen 
[The Forgotten Genocide: Sochi and the Tragedy of the Circassians] (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag 2013). 
30 Krzysztof Popek, “Afera Brunnbauer-Balewa a współczesne nurty historiografii bułgarskiej wobec zagadnienia 




propagated via a few popular Bulgarian-language novels published from the 1860s to the 1880s, the 
‘crowning achievement’ in this regard being Ivan Vazov’s novel Pod Igoto (Under the Yoke). The 
author wrote it in Odessa, Russian Empire (today’s Odesa in Ukraine); this novel was published in 
1889-1890, and the English-language translation came off the press in 1894 in London.31 For better or 
worse, Vazov’s novel remains the main point of reference for Bulgarian literature and culture, and also 
the symbolical foundation of the Bulgarian national master narrative. Until the turn of the twentieth 
century, half of secondary school leavers and university graduates in Bulgaria received their education 
in Russia, which came together with the default anti-Ottoman and anti-Muslim (“anti-Turkish”) 
attitude.32 Furthermore, Russian and Russian-educated officers ran the Bulgarian army until 1887, 
when its language of command was finally changed from Russian to Bulgarian.33 Interestingly, in the 
Bulgarian national master narrative, the myth of “Phanariot (Greek) yoke” (фанариотско [гръцко] 
робство fanariotsko [grutsko] robstvo) was more potent than that of the “Turkish yoke” until the 
Balkan Wars, in the wake of which Greeks left or were expelled from Bulgaria.34 
However, the myth of “Turkish yoke” stands in sharp contrast to the recorded reality of Pax 
Ottomanica, which ensured peace, stability and economic prosperity – also in Rumelia (‘Roman lands,’ 
that is, the Balkans) – between the sixteenth century and the late eighteenth century, or at the time 
 
Bulgarian Historiography on the Question of Turkish {Ottoman} Rule in Bulgaria] Studenckie Zeszyty Naukowe Instytutu 
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2019). 
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kwestii cerkiewnej między periodykami „Bułgaria” a „Dunajski Łabędź” w latach 1859–1861” [Between the ‘Phanariote 
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when Christian Europe was convulsed by a series of genocidal religious wars.35 Hence, it is hard to 
discuss Turks and Muslims as victims at the hands of ethnic Bulgarians, even if it was the latter, who 
overwhelmingly constituted the communist apparatus of repression. Obviously, the Ottoman Empire 
was not any paradise, either. Non-Muslims, despite enjoying ethnoreligious non-territorial autonomies 
(millets), were actually second-rank subjects of the sultan. For instance, the practice of devşirme “levy 
of boys” (دوشيرمه, literally “lifting, collecting” in Osmanlıca) from the Christian millets to the empire’s 
janissary forces (يڭيچرى yeñi çeri “new soldier” in Osmanlıca) was often heartbreaking for parents and 
ended in tragedy for some of these boys, though a few made a high-flying career in the imperial 
administration. The Ottomans preferred officials recruited through devşirme to “old Muslims” for the 
sake of limiting corruption and nepotism.36 In the Russian Empire a similar practice of seizing Jewish 
boys and teenagers (“cantonists”) for the army was practiced between 1827 and 1854, de facto leading 
to their subsequent Christianization and Russification.37 Western European empires also used such 
arbitrary and inhumane methods to seize indispensable workforce, as in the case of “impressment” for 
forcing boys and young adults into service in the British navy. In the case of Irish-speaking Catholics 
press-ganged in this manner, it meant de facto conversion to Protestantism and a switch to speaking 
English only, which was similar to the compulsory change in language and religion, which devşirme 
boys experienced in their janissary units.38 During the last two centuries, compulsory military service, 
 
35 Cf. Kemal Çiçek, ed., Pax Ottomana: Studies in Memoriam Prof. Dr. Nejat Göyünç (Ankara: Sota 2001); Stephen 
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Honour of Suraiya Faroqhi, ed. Markus Koller and Vera Costantini (Ser: The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage, Politics, 
Society and Economy, Vol 39) (Leiden: Brill 2008): 347; Ezel Kural Shaw, “The Ottoman Aspects of Pax Ottomanica: The 
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Dissent in Eastern Europe; Peter F. Sugar, Southeastern Europe Under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804 (Ser: A History of East 
Central Europe, Vol 5) (Seattle WA: University of Washington Press 1977), 109, 275. 
36 Kathryn Hain, “Devshirme is a Contested Practice,” Utah Historical Review 2 (2012): 165-176. 
37  Jerzy Tomaszewski, Najnowsze dzieje Żydów w Polsce w zarysie (do 1950 roku) [The Latest History of Jews in Poland 
(Since 1950)]. (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 1993): 19. 
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as practiced in the majority of Europe’s nation-states, has often been an imposition from above on an 
unwilling population, entailing forced linguistic and/or religious assimilation of soldiers stemming 
from minorities.39 
 Although succumbing to mythologizing the past may result in a potent unifying national master 
narrative, this approach is not conducive to objective historiography. Furthermore, when myths are too 
much at odds with the actual (checkable) reality of the past, the tension may lead to social or political 
strife, and even to military conflict. How to detect a historical myth? It is a fact or a phenomenon 
(alongside its ‘correct patriotic interpretation’), which is posed as a “historical truth.” What is more, the 
myth of this kind tends to function as a constitutive (nodal) element in a national master narrative, and 
is evoked, when needed, for the sake of national mobilization. When a scholar aspires to verify the 
veracity of the myth with the use of documents and other evidence, her efforts are speedily thwarted by 
public opprobrium and arguments ad hominem, often generated with the employment of administrative 
measures at the disposal of a given nation-state.40 A well-known “fact” is a myth, when this purported 
“fact” is not supported by evidence, while oftentimes is politically “sacralized” by taught in school as 
the “national truth.”41 It is so especially in cases when the administration of a nation-state is summarily 
deployed for preventing any dispassionate analysis of such a myth (“fact”), and for turning public 
opinion against the researcher who may dare to commit an unheard of act of “national blasphemy,” 
namely, by attempting to fact-check the myth.42  
 
39  I benefited from discussing this issue with Konstanty Gebert. 
40 Cf. Martina Baleva and Ulf Brunnbauer, eds., Batak kato miasto na pametta / Batak als bulgarischer Erinnerungsort 
[Bataks as a Bulgarian lieu de memoire] (Sofia: Iztok-Zapad 2007); Krzysztof Popek, “The Manipulation of Photographs by 
Dimitar Cavra and Its Influence on the Creation of the Myth of the Batak Massacre (1876) in Bulgarian Historiography,” in: 
Alicja Bemben et al., eds.,  Cryptohistories (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2015): 115-125; 
Aleksandur Vazenkov, “Proektut i skandalut Batak” [The Batak Project and Scandal] Anamneza 4 (2009): 132-203. 
41 For instance, in present-day Bulgaria school textbooks propose, without any hint of irony, that the world’s first-ever 
civilization emerged on the territory of today’s Bulgaria. Furthermore, Bulgaria is posed as Europe’s oldest surviving state 
and at the same time one of the modern world’s extant 12 civilizations. In addition, Bulgarian is proposed to be one of the 
globe’s oldest languages endowed with a writing system. Cf.  Konstadin Konstadinov, Uchebnik po rodinoznanie. Ot 1. do 
4. Klas [Textbook of the Knowledge About the Motherland {that is, Bulgaria}: From Grade 1 Through Grade 4] (Dobrich: 
Izdatelstvo Iliia Vulchev 2016), p. 9 and back cover blurb. 
42  Cf. Jerzy Topolski, Jak się pisze i rozumie historię. Tajemnice narracji historycznej [How to Write and Comprehend 




 Although obviously not involved in the production of the Bulgarian national master narrative, 
Turkish scholars also have a problem with taking a proper note of the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing. Thus far, 
no Turkish-language history or analysis of this tragic event has been published. The few books devoted 
to this ethnic cleansing, which appeared in Turkey, are collections of expellees’ life stories that tend to 
be published in extremely low print runs.43 The myopia was caused, first, by the long-lasting separation 
of national Turkish history from the non-national Ottoman past. In this schema, from Ankara’s 
perspective, the events in the political and social life of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims properly belong 
to the latter, not the former. Second, from the perspective of historical dis/continuities, the main point 
of reference for Turkish scholars is the concept of muhacir, that is, “migrant, refugee.”44 This Turkish 
term of Arabic origin45 refers to Muslim populations displaced from the territories of the Ottoman 
Empire, seized between the eighteenth century and 1923 by the Christian empires of Austria and 
Russia, and by the Balkan nation-states. Later, this term was also applied to Muslims of various 
ethnicities expelled from Bulgaria, Greece,46 Romania, Serbia, or Yugoslavia to Turkey. However, in 
 
43  Cf. Seher Boykoy, ed., 25. Yılında Bulgaristan'dan 1989 Göçü [The 25th Anniversary of the Emigration from Bulgaria] 
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Kurumu Yayınları, Vol 67; Tarihe not düşmek: 1989 göçü, Vol 4) (Ankara: Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu 
2013). 
44 Cf. Arsen Avagyan, Tiran Lokmagyozyan and Ragıp Zarakolu, eds., Türk dış siyasetinde Kuzey Kafkasya siyasi 
muhacereti (1920-1971) [Immigration from the North Caucasus in Turkish Foreign Policy (1920-1971)] (Ser: Türkiye 
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faaliyetleri (1860-1923) [Immigration Commissions and Their Activities from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic (1860-
1923)] (Ser: Türk Tarih Kurumu yayınları, Series IV/A-2-2.4, Vol 17) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları 2018). 
45 Muhacir is the Turkish (Osmanlıca) phonemic adaptation of the Arabic term  مهاجر muhājir, hence, in English it is also 
transliterated directly from Arabic as muhajir. In turn, this word is derived from the Arabic term  ِهْجَرة Hijra “migration,” 
which denotes the move of Muhammed and his followers from Mecca to Medina. The inhabitants of Medina who accepted 
them, became known as the أنـــــصــــار 'ansar “supporters,” for their hospitality to the muhajirs. Therefore, it has been a 
useful concept for Islamic polities whenever they want to justify the reception of Muslim refugees, like the case of Syrians 
in contemporary Turkey. (I thank Egemen Yılgür for this insightful comment.) 
46 In the context of the 1923 “population exchange” (that is, parallel expulsions) between Greece and Turkey (known in 
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Turkish term for these expellees is mübadil “exchangee.” Sometimes, by extension, this term is employed for referring to 
Turkish (and Muslim) expellees from other Balkan states, though in most cases these expulsions were unilateral, rather than 
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the ideologized process of the continuing Turkicization of the Turkish language,47 after World War II, 
the Arabo-Ottoman term muhajir was replaced with the Turkic neologism göçmen.48 In the context of 
Turkish ethnolinguistic nationalism, the Turkish term soydaş “ethnic kin, co-ethnics” became popular 
in the late twentieth century for referring to Turkish (and Slavophone Muslim) expellees from the 
Balkans.49 This longue durée perspective that conflates temporal and spatial discontinuities between the 
Ottoman Empire and Turkey is also informed by important studies of western scholars,50 which tend to 
present the experience of the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing as part and parcel of Turkish ‘migration’ (göç) 
from Bulgaria to Turkey.51 
 
What is in the Name? 
From this aforementioned longue durée perspective, the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing appears to be a mere 
spike in the two-centuries-long continuum of ‘(forced) migrations’ of Muslims from the northern Black 
Sea littoral, the Caucasus and the Balkans in the wake of Christian (imperial or national) conquests. 
This Turkish historiographic interpretation of the events reinforces the Bulgarian approach, which 
proposes that the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing was none other than such a spike in the continuous (voluntary) 
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migration of Turks (and Slavophone Muslims, or Pomaks) from Bulgaria to Turkey in the period from 
the Russian founding of this nation-state in 1878 to the fall of communism. In turn, western scholars 
also adopt this interpretation labelling this type of population movement as “emigration,” while 
reserving the biblical term “exodus” for the “spikes,” as induced by warfare or the use of blatant 
coercion or force.52 
 Hence, it should not be surprising that the most thorough reference on ethnic cleansing in 
Europe published thus far, Lexikon der Vertreibungen: Deportation, Zwangsaussiedlung und ethnische 
Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts (Lexicon of Expulsions: Deportations, Forced Expulsions 
and Ethnic Cleansing in twentieth-century Europe), refers to the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing as “an act of 
emigration” (Emigrationsakt) and “mass flight” (Massenflucht).53 The book’s authors refuse to 
recognize the tragic event as ethnic cleansing (ethnische Sauberung) or expulsion (Vertreibung), 
though they acknowledge that “some elements of expulsion” (Elemente der Vertreibung) could be 
detected in it.54 
 As a result, a self-reinforcing feedback has been created between Bulgarian, international and 
Turkish interpretations of the character of the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing. Because Bulgarian and Turkish 
scholars and commentators tend to refer to it as “(e)migration,” their international counterparts – in 
good faith – tend to adopt this term, too. In turn, Bulgarian and Turkish scholars and commentators fall 
back on such an international opinion to “prove” their point. Rarely does anyone try to break out of this 
solipsistic vicious circle in order to carry out a check-up by applying a definition of emigration or 
ethnic cleansing to the facts on the ground. 
 
52 Cf. Wolfgang Höpken, “Der Exodus: Muslimische Emigration aus Bulgarien im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert” [The Exodus: 
Muslim Emigration from Bulgaria in the 19th and 20th Centuries] in Reinhard Lauer and Hans Georg Majer, eds., Osmanen 
und Islam in Südosteuropa (Ser: Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Neue Folge, Vol 24) 
(Berlin: De Gruyter 2014): 303-431. 
53 Detlef Brandes, Holm Sundhaussen and Stefan Troebst, eds., Lexikon der Vertreibungen: Deportation, 
Zwangsaussiedlung und ethnische Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts [Lexicon of Expulsions: Deportations, 
Forced Expulsions and Ethnic Cleansing in 20th-Century Europe] (Vienna: Böhlau 2010): 95-6, 666-7. 




 Hence, in Bulgaria the zhivkovite propaganda’s term Голямата екскурзия Goliamata 
ekskurziia (‘Big Excursion’) continues predominating as the preferred label for the 1989 Ethnic 
Cleansing (cf Apostolova 2008), while that of 1989 Göçü (‘1989 Migration’) in Turkey.55 Bulgarian 
scholars, who wish to use the former term more critically, put it in between inverted commas as 
“Goliamata ekskurziia,”56 while very few propose to speak of екзодус ekzodus (“exodus”).57 However, 
often the supposedly required inverted commas are forgotten or omitted in the case of the former term, 
making it back into a zhivkovite euphemism, which is preferred by Bulgarian nationalists. On the other 
hand, the term “exodus” comes with no discrete definition and confusing biblical references on top of 
that, which are not appropriate in the case of the overwhelmingly Muslim expellees.  
 In the early 1990s, the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing was still known in Turkey under the more 
appropriate term of büyük göç (“Big Migration”),58 or that of the 1989 Bulgaristan zorunlu göç (“1989 
Forced Migration from Bulgaria”).59 Seldom is this expulsion ever referred to as etnik temzilik (“ethnic 
cleansing”),60 or kov(ul)ma (“expulsion”)61 in Turkish-language literature. The Turkish reluctance to 
 
55  Cf. Seher, ed., 25. Yılında Bulgaristan'dan 1989 Göçü. 
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1989 [‘The Big Excursion:’ The Forced Deportation of Ethnic Turks from Bulgaria, June-August 1989] (2 vols) (Sofia: At 
author’s expense 2011); Cahdar Marinov, ““Vuzroditelniiat protses” i “goliamata ekskurziia” (1984-1989 g.)” [‘The 
Revival Process’ and the ‘Big Excursion’ (1984-1989)] in Ivailo Znepolski, ed., Istoriia na Narodna republika Bulgariia 
[History of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria] (pp 511-515). (Sofia: Ciela and Institut za izsledvane na blizkoto minalo 
2009); Khristo Khristov. 2016. “S ‘Goliamata ekskurziia’ Zhivkov dopulnitelno vloshil ikonomicheskoto polozhenie v 
Bulgariya [With the ‘Big Excursion’” {Which He Ordered} Zhivkov Further Worsened the Economic Situation in 
Bulgaria]. Mediapool 2 Sept 2016 www.mediapool.bg/s-golyamata-ekskurziya-zhivkov-dopalnitelno-vloshil-
ikonomicheskoto-polozhenie-v-bulgaria-news253686.html (Accessed 27 September 2016). 
57 Cf. Avramov, Ikonomika na ,Vuzroditelniya protses’, 261. 
58 Cf. Ercüment Konukman and Kutlay Doğan, Tarihi belgeler ışığında büyük göç ve Anavatan [The Great Immigration and 
the Motherland: In Light of Historical Documents] (Ankara: Türk Basın Birliği 1990). 
59 Cf. “1989 Bulgaristan Zorunlu Göç” [The 1989 Forced Migration {of Turks} from Bulgaria] 2012 
http://1989zorunlugoc.blogspot.co.uk (Accessed 12 July 2016); “Sofya’dan zorunlu göç” [Sofia {Orders} Forced 
Migration] Cumhuriyet. 26 May 1989, 1. 
60 Cf. Dokuzuncu Askerî Tarih Semineri bildirileri: Türkiye cumhuriyeti'ni ilgilendiren genel konular ile XIX. ve XX. 
yüzyıllarda Osmanlı devleti ve Türkiye cumhuriyeti'nin Balkanlar'daki askerî, siyasî, iktisadî ve toplumsal ilişkileri: 22-24 
Ekim 2003, İstanbul [The Proceedings of the Ninth Military History Seminar: Turkey in the 19th and 20th Centuries from 
the Ottoman Empire to the Republic in the Broader Context of the Balkans and with Further Contributions on Military, 
Political, Economic and Social Relations in the Republic of Turkey: 22-24 October 2003 in Istanbul] (Vol 1) (Ser: Gnkur. 
Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı yayınları) (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basım Evi 2005): 242-243. 
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use a straightforward term for referring to the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing is caused by Ankara’s 
unwillingness to bring any international attention to Turkey’s ongoing ethnic cleansing of Kurds, which 
flared up into a full-scale civil war during 1984-1999.62 As a result, the Turkish government was also 
careful not to criticize the Zhivkov regime too vociferously when the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing was in full 
swing. They knew that Bulgaria was ready to point to Ankara’s ongoing ethnic cleansing of Kurds, 
first, for shaming Turkey, and second, in order to show world public opinion that Sofia’s treatment of 
Bulgarian Turks was more lenient (or “civilized”).63 And it appears that to this day Sofia is ready to 
employ this ‘argument’ for silencing any of Ankara’s criticisms of Bulgaria’s mistreatment of the 
country’s Turks and Slavophone Muslims (or Pomaks).64 
 
A Way Forward 
The first step toward an improved comprehension of the past is a rejection of sacralized historical 
myths, seen as ‘undisputed and unanalyzable truths.’ Second, continuities and discontinuities applied 
for probing into the past should be nuanced for the sake of improved comprehension of analyzed 
events, and must not be treated as an unmodifiable given. For instance, the Turkish penchant for the 
longue durée view of the emigration of Muslims from the Ottoman Empire’s shrinking borderlands 
conquered by Christian powers from the eighteenth century through the turn of the twentieth century 
could be enriched with a reflection on the colonial techniques of ethnic cleansing and genocide as 
developed and deployed by the Russian Empire alongside the Black Sea’s northern and western shores, 
 
62 Cf. Cengiz Gunet and Welat Zeydanlıoğlu, eds., The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, 
Representation, and Reconciliation (London: Routledge 2014). 
63 Cf. Salakh Bedreddin, Kiurdite – muchenitsi v sobstvenata si rodina [The Kurds – Martyrs in their Own Homeland] 
[translated from the Arabic] (Sofia: Asotsiatsiia KAVA za kiurdska kultura 1992); “Bulgaria: Kurds Stand Fast Against 
Turk’s Oppression,” Daily Report: Eastern Europe. Index 8 (1985) 29 November. 
64 Cf. Delco [= Delcho] Balabanov, Kurtlerin [sic] Soy ve Tarihleri [The Noble Kurds in Dates] (Sofia: Bulgaristan 
Kurdistan'la Dayanisma Komitesi 1998); Petur Petrov, ed., Mezhdunarodna konferentsiia za Kurdistan [The International 





and in the Caucasus.65 Then such a change in methodology would make it possible to assess Russian 
actions in the Caucasus in 1864 as the Circassian Genocide,66 or analyze the 1877-1878 Russian 
conquest of Bulgaria in terms of ethnic cleansing and genocide.67 However, this methodological leap in 
thinking about the past would require scaling the political obstacle in the form of Ankara’s insistence 
on not recognizing the 1915 Ottoman genocide of Armenians and Assyrians68.69 From the longue durée 
perspective, the Ottomans learned this murderous technique of politicized ‘population management’ 
from imperial Russia. 
 On the other hand, through the lens of Bulgarian history, the period of 1877/1878-1989 can be 
defined as a “national revolution,”70 or the period of the construction of the Bulgarian nation-state 
through the unceasing policy of ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic homogenization (“purification,” or 
de-Turkicization and de-Islamization). In this ideological framework Muslims, Jews and non-
Bulgarian-speakers were defined as ‘un-Bulgarian aliens’ who had to be assimilated or expelled in 
order to produce “pure” (that is, through and through Orthodox and Slavophone) Bulgaria.71 The 
Ottoman tradition of the millet system (or non-territorial autonomies for ethnoreligious communities) 
and Bulgaria’s international obligations, alongside the tradition of interethnic and interconfessional 
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67  Cf. James Donaldson, Atrocités Russes en Asie et en Roumelie pendant les mois de Juin, Juillet et Aout 1877 [The 
Russian Atrocities in {Ottoman} Asia and Rumelia in the Months of June, July and August 1877] (Constantinople 
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68 Cf. Taner Akçam, From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide (London: Zed Books 
2004). 
69 The 1915 genocide of Armenians and Assyrians appears to shame today’s Turkey, as long as no clear distinction is 
maintained between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. The latter was founded in 1923, so the Turkish 
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does preclude personal responsibility in the case of Ottoman officials who then became civil servants in Turkey (cf 
Benjamin C. Fortna, The Circassian: A Life of Esref Bey, Late Ottoman Insurgent and Special Agent (New York: Oxford 
University Press 2016)). 
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political quest for ethnolinguistic and ethnoconfessional “purity” of the Bulgarian nation-state, on the one hand, and 
postcommunist pro-European Bulgaria, on the other hand, where such policies are condemned and not employed.  




komşuluk (“[good] neighborliness,” known as комшулук komshuluk in Bulgarian),72 mitigated this 
divisive policy of ‘purification’ until Bulgaria’s 1908 declaration of independence from the Ottoman 
Empire. Until that time Slavophone Muslims (or Pomaks) and Turks in Bulgaria were largely left to 
their devices, while their emigration to the Ottoman Empire was mostly voluntary, though frequently 
triggered by the dramatically changing economic situation (mainly due to the seizure and redistribution 
of large Muslim owners’ land among Bulgarian peasants73). The point break is 1912-1914, or the 
period of the Balkan Wars. During this conflict and afterward, that is, until 1989, migrations of Turks 
and Slavophone Muslims (or Pomaks) from Bulgaria and their assimilation became invariably forced in 
their character, with moments of intensification, which are easily recognizable as acts of ethnic 
cleansing.74 
 Finally, in 2012, the democratic and liberal deputies gained the sufficient majority in the 
Bulgarian Parliament for adopting the momentous Declaration Condemning the Attempted Forced 
Assimilation of Bulgarian Muslims.75 This Declaration unequivocally recognizes the 1989 expulsion of 
Bulgaria’s Turks (and Slavophone Muslims, or Pomaks) as етническо прочистване etnichesko 
prochistvane “ethnic cleansing”76 (see the English translation of this Declaration below). Curiously, 
 
72 The term komşuluk may also denote “neighborhood,” and stems from Turkic komşu “neighbor,” which, among others, 
yielded komshi “neighbor” in Albanian, or комшија komšija “neighbor” in Macedonian. 
73 Krzysztof Popek, “‘A Body Without a Head:’ The Elite of the Muslim Minority in the Bulgarian Lands at the Turn of the 
20th Century,” Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et studia 25 (2018): 133-4. 
74 Krzysztof Popek, “Muhadżirowie. Uwagi na temat emigracji muzułmanów z ziem bułgarskich na przełomie XIX i XX 
wieku” [Muhajirs: Remarks on the Emigration of Muslims from the Bulgarian Lands in the 19th and 20th Centuries] (pp 47-
69).  Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et studia 23 (2016): 64-5. 
75 “Deklaratsiia osuzhdashta opita za nasilstvena asimilatsiia na bulgarskite miusiulmani” [The Declaration Condemning the 
Attempted Forced Assimilation of Bulgarian Muslims] (Sofia: Narodno Sobranie na Respublika Bulgariia 2012) 11 January. 
www.parliament.bg/bg/declaration/ID/13813. (Accessed 14 July 2015). 
76 Implicitly (by stating that it adheres ‘to the highest achievements of European and world thought, [and to] international 
law in the sphere of human rights and minority rights’ [“Deklaratsiia osuzhdashta opita za nasilstvena asimilatsiia na 
bulgarskite miusiulmani”]), this Declaration espouses the internationally adopted definition of ethnic cleansing, as derived 
from the 1994 UN opinion, namely, “Based on the many reports describing the policy and practices conducted in the former 
Yugoslavia, ‘ethnic cleansing’ has been carried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial 
executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and 
deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton 
destruction of property. Those practices constitute crimes against humanity and can be assimilated to specific war crimes. 
Furthermore, such acts could also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention” (“Letter Dated 24 May 1994 from 
the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council” (New York: United Nations 1994). 24 May, 33 




this highly significant document is relatively unknown in Bulgaria, and almost completely unknown 
outside the country, including Turkey. The first full English translation of the Declaration was made 
available only in 2019.77 Not that this document is without any problems, for instance, the use of the 
sobriquet “Bulgarian Muslims” in order to avoid mentioning the ethnonym “Turks.” This usage, which 
verges on the denial of identity, appears to perpetuate the zhivkiovite tradition of claiming that after 
1985 there were no minorities left in communist Bulgaria, so the country’s Turks had to be referred to 
as “Bulgarian Muslims.”78 This unfortunate collocation continues to be employed in today’s Bulgaria 
for dubbing (and at times, for suppressing) Pomaks (Slavophone Muslims).79 I infer that the use of this 
term in the Declaration is a result of a compromise with nationalists in the ranks of Bulgarian 
democrats. 
 But whatever the shortcomings of this document may be, the Declaration can successfully 
function as a foundation for long overdue and much needed Bulgarian-Turkish reconciliation, meaning 
between Bulgaria and its Turkish minority, and between Sofia and Ankara. Jan Józef Lipski, a 
precursor and one of the foremost figures of the post-1989 German-Polish reconciliation, wisely 
noticed that “[w]e must tell all to each other [that is, the Poles to the Germans and vice versa…]. 
Without this the burden of the past will not let us enter a common future” (Musimy powiedzieć sobie 
 
Statute of the International Criminal Court  among various ‘crimes against humanity’ (Article 5.1.a), in Article 7, among 
others, defines the two following crimes against humanity, which fulfill the aforementioned definition of ethnic cleansing, 
namely, “‘Deportation or forcible transfer of population,’ mean[ing] forced displacement of the persons concerned by 
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under 
international law” and “‘Persecution,’ against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, gender […], or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, 
[…] mean[ing] the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the 
identity of the group or collectivity” (“Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” 17 July 1998 
http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (Accessed 29 February 2016)). 
77 Declaration in Tomasz Kamusella, “Words Matter: Bulgaria and the 30th Anniversary of the Largest Ethnic Cleansing in 
Cold War Europe” New Eastern Europe (2019) 25 February. http://neweasterneurope.eu/2019/02/25/words-matter-bulgaria-
and-the-30th-anniversary-of-the-largest-ethnic-cleansing-in-cold-war-europe%EF%BB%BF/ (Accessed: 29 April 2019). 
78 Cf. Jeri Laber, Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Bulgaria: An Update (Ser: Helsinki Watch Report) (New York: 
US Helsinki Watch Committee 1987). 
79 Elka Mincheva, “‘Sluchaiat Iakoruda’ – mezhdu durzhavna politika i samoidentifikatsiia. 2. ‘Makedontsi’ i ‘turtsi’ – 90-te 
godini na XX vek” [‘The Iakoruda Case’ – Between Self-Identification and State Policy. 2. ‘Macedonians’ and ‘Turks’ in 




wszystko […]. Bez tego ciężar przeszłości nie pozwoli nam wejść we wspólną przyszłość).80 Hopefully, 
this truth will not be lost on Bulgarian and Turkish elites, including historians, especially those who are 
responsible for school curricula and education. 
 Unfortunately, Turkish scholars appear not to know the Declaration and they obediently toe the 
line of Turkey’s political sensibilities, preferring not to speak of “ethnic cleansing” in the case of the 
1989 expulsion.81 Their Bulgarian counterparts, almost invariably label this tragedy with the zhivkovite 
term “Goliamata ekskurziia,” mostly placed in between inverted commas. In this manner, quite 
curiously, Bulgarian researchers and intellectuals question the word and spirit of the Declaration. As an 
explanation, they maintain that they employ this now historical term for the sake of avoiding 
anachronism. But when pushed further about this issue, Bulgarians scholars go to lengths to emphasize 
that this usage is not any adoption or endorsement of zhivkovite propaganda. They claim that they use 
this term in a critical and objective manner, the required distancing latter supposedly ensured by the 
tenuous device of inverted commas.82 
 For the sake of comparing the coining and usage of terms employed for labeling emotionally 
and politically sensitive historical events, I propose to analyze how relevant terminology has developed 
for referring to the Jewish Holocaust. The German-language neologism Endlösung (“Final Solution”) 
was the Nationalist Socialist (Nazi) coinage of the Third Reich’s administration for the policy of 
exterminating Jews (and Roma) as a people. Beginning at the turn of the 1950s, the Greek neologism 
 
80 Jan Józef Lipski, “Odprężenie i pojednanie. Polemika z Günterem Grassem” [Détente and Reconciliation : A Polemic 
with Günter Grass] in Jan Józef Lipski, Powiedzieć sobie wszystko…. Eseje o sąsiedztwie polsko-niemieckim / Wir müssen 
uns alles sagen…. Essays zur deutsch-polnischen Nachbarschaft [edited by Georg Ziegler] (Gliwice and Warsaw: 
Wydawnictwo „Wokół Nas” and Wydawnictwo Polsko-Niemieckie 1996 [1985]), 89-90. 
81 Perhaps, a new opening in Turkish scholarship on the subject of the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing may be offered by İbrahim 
Kamil’s monumental eight-volume collection of primary sources Bulgaristan Türkleri ve göçler. Bulgaristan Komünist 
Partisi gizli belgeleri (1944-1989) [Bulgarian Turks and Migrations: Secret Documents of the Communist Party of Bulgaria 
[1944-1989]) (Ankara: Atatürk Araştirma Merkezi Yayınları), which was published in 2018. Significantly, four volumes – 
that is, half of this work – are devoted to the latter half of the 1980s alone. And out of these four volumes, the three last ones 
focus on the planning and the carrying out of the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing. These proportions seem to vindicate the 2012 
Declaration’s decision to label the anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim policies pursued during the last five years of communism 
in communist Bulgaria, as ‘forced assimilation,’ and the 1989 expulsion as ‘ethnic cleansing.’ I thank Elena Marushiakova 
and Veselin Popov for bringing this collection to my attention. 




Holocaust (Ολοκαύτωμα Olokáftoma, “sacrificial offering [to gods] by burning”) became popular 
across the English-speaking world. Earlier, this English-language neologism had been applied for 
referring to the 1895 massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. The biblical term Shoah (שואה 
“calamity, disaster, catastrophe” in Hebrew) appeared in the English-language press in the context of 
the genocide of Jews already in the early 1940s. Jews prefer this term to the non-Jewish name 
“Holocaust,” especially after the latter came to be used for referring to genocides of other peoples, for 
instance, the Roma.83  
 In the English-language literature, all the three terms were employed in an equal measure until 
the late 1960s. Subsequently, “Holocaust” became the preferred term, while the frequency of the use of 
‘Shoah’ took over ‘Final Solution’ at the turn of the twenty-first century. Nowadays, the term 
“Holocaust” is employed in English-language publications over seven time more frequently than the 
two other terms.84 In German-language literature, the term Endlösung dominated until the late 1970s. 
Nowadays, the term “Holocaust” is employed four times more frequently in German-language 
publications than Endlösung.85 
 It is high time that in Bulgaria and Turkey a discussion would be devoted to the clear-cut 
recognition of the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing and to the question with what name(s) it should be referred 
to. Without this step, research on the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing will continue to be hindered and 
questioned. Significantly, any discussion or research must involve victims of the 1989 Ethnic 
Cleansing, so they could voice what their memories, expectations and wishes may be. These victims 
 
83 Zev Garber and Bruce Zuckerman, “Why Do We Call the Holocaust ‘The Holocaust?: An Inquiry into the Psychology of 
Labels,” Modern Judaism 9, no. 2 (1989): 197-211. 




%2Cc0%3B.t1%3B%2CShoah%3B%2Cc0 (Accessed 29 April 2019). 
85 “Holocaust,Endlösung” Ngram Viewer 2019 
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should become the main subject of this discourse and they should be entrusted with leading the 
discourse. 
 Only in the mid-1960s, thirty years after the war, with the Frankfurt Trials, did West Germany 
begin coming to terms with the fact that the majority of wartime Germany’s elite were directly or 
indirectly involved in the preparation and execution of the Holocaust.86 This breakthrough occurred 
thanks to the lone courageous and principled Attorney General of the Land of Hessen, Fritz Bauer 
(1903-1968). He was a Jew and opposed the Allies’ and West Germany’s complacency, or the 
“pragmatic” approach that entailed forgetting about the past for the sake of opposing successfully the 
Soviet bloc in the course of the Cold War. Bauer brought as many as possible war criminals to the dock 
from the territory of his jurisdiction. Most of his counterparts in the other Länder of Germany remained 
inactive in this regard. At present, with the privilege of hindsight, we can say that Bauer singlehandedly 
saved Germany’s honor.87 
 Now, three decades after the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing, Bulgaria still awaits a Fritz Bauer of its 
own, who would save the country’s honor by fulfilling the Declaration’s heartfelt appeal, “We call 
upon the Bulgarian Justice and the Attorney General of the Republic of Bulgaria that they ensure 
completion of the case against the perpetrators of the so-called ‘Revival Process’.”88 Thus far, not a 
single perpetrator of the 1989 Ethnic Cleansing has been brought to justice. At the same time, the 
victims and their descendants, both in Bulgaria and Turkey, must suffer the indignity of the burgeoning 
personality cult of the ethnic cleanser Todor Zhivkov, who is incongruously celebrated with the flag of 
the European Union unfurled at his monument in Pravets.89 Even worse, Bulgaria’s incumbent Prime 
 
86 Devin O. Pendas, The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963–65: Genocide, History and the Limits of the Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2010). 
87 Ronen Steinke, Fritz Bauer, oder, Auschwitz vor Gericht [Fritz Bauer, or Auschwitz in the Dock] (Zürich: Piper 2013). 
88 “Deklaratsiia osuzhdashta opita za nasilstvena asimilatsiia na bulgarskite miusiulmani.” 
89 Tomasz Kamusella “Bulgaria: An Unlikely Personality Cult” New Eastern Europe (2018) 7 September 




Minister, Boiko Borisov, praises this ethnic cleanser as a “great Bulgarian leader”.90 Borisov is the sole 
EU leader who publicly extols an ethnic cleanser. Unfortunately, this example encourages nationalists 
and populists, who nowadays rework the Bulgarian national myth of the “five centuries of Turkish 
yoke” as the петвековният геноцид petvekovniiat genotsid “five centuries of the {Bulgarian} 




The Bulgarian Parliament’s momentous 2012 Declaration is relatively unknown in Bulgaria itself and 
utterly unknown abroad. There is no full translation of the Declaration into any foreign language. 
Hence, to ameliorate this gaping omission, I translated this important document into English. The 
Declaration adds importantly to Europe’s liberal tradition of freedoms and human rights. 
  
The Declaration Condemning the Attempted Forced Assimilation of Bulgarian Muslims 
  
We, the Deputies of the 41st [Bulgarian] National Assembly  
  
- referring to the highest achievements of European and world thought, [and to] international law in the 
sphere of human rights and minority rights; 
  
 
90 “Borisov: Todor Zhivkov kato vseki chovek si ima svoite slabosti, ima i svoite uspekhi” [Borisov: Todor Zhivkov, Like 
All Had Some Weaknesses, {While on the Other Hand} Achieved Success, Too] Mediapool (2011) 7 September 
www.mediapool.bg/borisov-todor-zhivkov-kato-vseki-chovek-si-ima-svoite-slabosti-ima-i-svoite-uspehi-news183746.html  
(Accessed 16 March 2016); Emiliia Karaabova “Borisov: Greia navsiakude, no ne moga da stigna Zhivkov [Borisov: Shines 
in Every Aspect, but I Cannot Understand {Why He Needs to Praise} Zhivkov] Trud (2010) 6 November 
www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=666842 (Accessed 16 March 2016). 
91 Veselin Bozhkov, Petvekovniiat genotsid [The Five Centuries of the {Turkish} Genocide {of Bulgarians}] (Sofia: 





 - referring to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 
  
 - expressing our deepest regret that since the beginning of the democratic changes, for 20 years, the 
Bulgarian justice system has failed to punish the perpetrators of the attempted forced assimilation of 
Bulgarian Muslims, including the so-called “Revival Process;” 
  
 - expressing our firm conviction that no statute of limitation can be applied to such crimes, 
  
WE DECLARE THAT: 
  
1. We condemn vociferously the assimilation policy of the [Bulgarian] totalitarian communist regime 
against the Muslim minority in the Republic of Bulgaria, including the so-called “Revival Process.”  
  
2. We declare the expulsion of more than 360.000 Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin [from Bulgaria 
to Turkey] in 1989 constitutes a form of ethnic cleansing committed by the [Bulgarian] totalitarian 
regime.  
  
3. We call upon the Bulgarian Justice and the Attorney General of the Republic of Bulgaria that they 
ensure completion of the case against the perpetrators of the so-called “Revival Process.” Efforts to 
terminate this case with the use of the statute of limitations means shifting the blame [for this atrocity] 





This Declaration was adopted by the 41st National Assembly on 11 January 2012 and is stamped with 
the official seal of the National Assembly. 
  
Bulgarian Parliament, Sofia, 11 January 201292 
  
NB: I put in bold the terms “forced assimilation” and “ethnic cleansing.” 
  
Translated from the Bulgarian by Tomasz Kamusella 
NB: The English translation may be freely reproduced,  
subject to citing its source and the translator’s name 
 
 
92 “Deklaratsiia osuzhdashta opita za nasilstvena asimilatsiia na bulgarskite miusiulmani.” 
